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THE POORLY FINANCED CAUSES OF
LITTLE PEOPLE: HOW CAN THEY
SURVIVE THE MULTITUDE OF
REGULATIONS?
ROBERT GOLDSMITH*

The Mental Health Association of Greater Chicago, an organization dedicated to improving the treatment of mental
health patients, has for about twenty years conducted a "bell
ringer" campaign in which volunteers go from house to house
seeking donations. In recent years the area canvassed by the
Mental Health Association has been greatly reduced by municipal ordinances 1 which regulate charitable solicitations. Nationwide, groups devoted to good work like the Mental Health
* Attorney for Citizens for a Better Environment; J.D., University of
Wisconsin Law School, 1978; B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1973. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Myron Cohen, law student at The John Marshall Law School.
1. Report of the Mental Health Association of Greater Chicago, June,
1979. Ordinances which have caused barriers in bell ringer campaigns in
the greater Chicago area include:
Suburb
Barrington
Brookfield
Elk Grove
Franklin Park
Hoffman Estates
Homewood
LaGrange
River Grove
Rolling Meadows
Schaumburg
Schiller Park
Wheeling

Restrictions
Permission denied
Permission denied
Registration and fingerprinting of
each marcher
Special badges
Special tags
Registration
Permission denied
Special tags
Permission denied
Special day
Fingerprinting
Permission denied

Final Year
of Solicitation
1975
1977
1977
1977
1975
1975
1973
1978
1974
1976
1977
1976

In addition, the Mental Health Association has, due to ordinance restrictions (as well as economic conditions), lost many volunteer marchers in recent years. The Association had 20,510 marchers in 1975 and 7,742 in 1980.
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Association have been affected by the increasing patchwork of
municipal regulations. 2 Such regulations can cause organizations to lose support, deny citizens an opportunity to support
3
their favorite causes, and ultimately stifle free speech.
This article will first explain the background of the problem
of municipal regulation of charitable solicitation, and will then
summarize the history of door-to-door canvassing to show its
evolution, current vitality, and importance. The United States
Supreme Court cases dealing with door-to-door canvassing will
be analyzed with an eye toward the practical effects of the decisions. Finally, a model ordinance will be suggested. If uniformly followed, such an ordinance could overcome the constant
skirmishing of case-by-case lawmaking.
BACKGROUND OF THE REGULATION PROBLEM

Door-to-door canvassing-talking to people at their homes
and asking for financial support-is a time-honored 5 method of
gaining support for political, religious, and charitable causes. It
is especially useful for new or little known causes which have
limited financial resources, but a great deal of energy and
human capital. 6 As Justice Black observed: "Door to door dis2. See Amicus Curiae Brief for Coalition of Nat'l Voluntary Organizations at 6-10, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S.
620 (1980). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (the
cumulative effect of an ordinance requiring door-to-door canvassers or solicitors of goods or merchandise of any kind to pay a daily license fee would
"suppress ...religious minorities"). Petitioners were Jehovah's Witnesses
distributing literature and soliciting purchase of religious books and pamphlets. See generally C. BAKAL, CHARrrv U.S.A. 322 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as BAKAL].
3. In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980) the Court struck down an ordinance because it interfered with protected speech.
4. The terms canvassing, soliciting, and peddling are used throughout
this article. The following definitions are appropriate unless otherwise indicated. Canvassing is talking to people and requesting financial support for
a not-for-profit organization. Soliciting refers only to asking for money for a
not-for-profit organization. Peddling refers to selling items or seeking orders for a for-profit concern.
5. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 nn.6-9 (1943) (noting the colportage activities of the American Tract Society and the American Bible
Society); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 nn.4-7 (1943) (hand
distribution of religious tracts is an age-old and potent force); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (the Court compared ordinances which imposed censorship on the dissemination of information to people in their
homes to those of a similar nature and effect in England which culminated
in the doctrine of freedom of the press). See generally M. KoNvrrz, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE 105 (1957) [hereinafter cited as KONviTz]; A.C. MARTS, PHILANTHROPY'S ROLE IN CIVILIZATION 96 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as MARTS].

6. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief for Los Angeles Council of Nat'l Vol-
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tribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of
'7

little people."

Despite its tradition and history, 8 door-to-door canvassing
engenders hostility both in the suburbs 9 and in academia. 10 The
United States Supreme Court has never enunciated a "right to
canvass."'" Rather, the Supreme Court has consistently recoguntary Health Agencies, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (discussing the effect of the municipality's 75%
"charitable purpose" provision on new or unorthodox groups). For a more
complete description of the Schaumburg ordinance, see text accompanying
notes 85-91 infra.
Public interest organizations such as the Wisconsin Environmental
Decade; groups devoted to broad organizing and lobbying such as the Illinois Public Action Council; and groups targeting specific issues such as the
National Women's Political Caucus ERA campaign all raise funds by using
canvassers who are devoted to the "cause" and will work for relatively low
wages. After all, the first amendment freedoms are not limited "merely to
those who can pay their own way." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
111 (1943).
7. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). See Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (early dictum on how the liberty of circulating publications is essential to the freedom of the press).
8. See note 5 supra and text accompanying notes 24-42 infra.
9. The attitude of many municipal authorities is that they have the
right to ban a particular organization from canvassing in their community.
See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Elm Grove, 462 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Wis.
1978). But see Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 174-75 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
concurring):
The stubborn persistence of the officials of smaller communities in
their efforts to regulate this conduct indicates a strongly held conviction
that the court's many decisions in this field are at odds with the realities of life in those communities where the householder himself drops
whatever he may be doing to answer the summons to the door and is
apt to have positive religious convictions of his own.
See generally KoNvrrz, supra note 5, at 105.
[hereinafter
10. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941)
cited as CHAFEE]. Professor Chafee set the tone: "House to house canvassing raises more serious problems. Of all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas, this seems the least entitled to protection. The possibilities of
persuasion are slight compared with the certainties of annoyance." Id. at
406. The Supreme Court has cited this passage with approval in Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), and Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 639 n.27 (1951). Professor Chafee, however, erred in his assessment of
the persuasiveness of door-to-door canvassing. Scores of successful
groups-Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN) (which canvasses in six states), Ohio Public Interest Campaign,
New York Public Interest Research Group, Citizens Action League of California, Indiana Citizens Action Coalition, Citizens Labor Energy Coalition,
and Massachusetts Fair Share-successfully raise funds by talking to people door-to-door about their activities. See generally R.M. O'NEAL, FREE
SPEECH, RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION UNDER LAw 54 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as O'NEAL] (citing other academic attitudes regarding door-to-door
canvassing); Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, FREE
SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION 378 (P. Kurland ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Stone].
11. '"There is, of course, no absolute right under the Federal Constitution to enter on the private premises of another and knock on a door for any
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nized the right of local governments to regulate the time, manner, and place of canvassing 12 for a variety of governmental
13
purposes including the prevention of crimes such as burglary
15
and the protection of
or fraud,14 the preservation of tranquility,
16
privacy.
the residents' right to
This support for the right of a state or local government to
regulate canvassing is tempered by the delicacy and primary importance of the first amendment rights involved.' 7 Hence, the
regulations must be drawn with "narrow specificity."' 18 This
rule, however, is not sufficient (or perhaps not specific enough)
to guide the regulators, who tend to adopt ordinances which go
as far as possible in upholding and furthering their governmental purposes.' 9 Often the ordinances are so restrictive that a
purpose, and the police power [of the state] permits reasonable regulation
for public safety." Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976). For a
more restrictive view of canvassing rights, see the dissenting opinion of Justices Frankfurter and Reed in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 152, 154 (1943).

Justice Reed asserted that the ordinance which created an absolute bar to
canvassing was constitutional. "Changing conditions have begotten modification by law of many practices once deemed a part of the individual's liberty." Id. at 157. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
444 U.S. 620, 644 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the Court
overestimates the value, in a constitutional sense, of door-to-door solicitation for financial contributions. . . ."); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157,

166 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring).

12. "It is equally clear that a State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting
upon its streets .... " Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
13. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,144 (1943). See also Hynes v. Mayor
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (citing Martin v. Struthers).
14. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
626-27 (1980); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
15. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307
(1940).
16. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636
(1980) (fraud, crime, and undue annoyance are substantial interests);
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616 (1976).
17. The rights are freedom of religion, press, and speech. See Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,108
(1943). These first amendment rights, protected from congressional action,
are also among the "fundamental personal rights and liberties which are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action."
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938). See generally Jones, SolicitationsCharitableand Religious, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 53 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Jones].
18. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 617, 620 (1976); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271
(1951).
19. "Thus the community has an interest in taking advance steps to prevent the perpetration of fraud-for example, by requiring all solicitors either to register upon coming to town or to carry with them at all times some
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group must either give up its attempt to canvass or sue. 20 Even
if the canvassing group wins in court, it has no assurance that
proof of identification of themselves and the legitimacy of their cause."
O'NEAL, supra note 10, at 73. The question of who will determine the "legitimacy" of a cause and what criteria will be used remains. Certain political
and religious causes such as The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification
of World Christianity ("Moonies") create indignation and fear among municipal officials. As a result, the officials believe they must protect their constituencies through overly restrictive regulations. See KoNvrrz, supra note
5, at 105 (describing this type of overreaction against early religious zealots).
In the Chicago area there are many examples of ordinances which are
overly restrictive: BARRINGTON, ILL., CODE art. 5, div. 3, § 13-213 (1973) (requires fingerprints and photographs by the police and specific approval by
the village board); BARTLETr, ILL., CODE ch. 15, art. XVI, § 15.1603 (1965)
("credentials and other evidence of the good moral character and identity of
the applicant" as well as two photographs of each canvasser, fingerprinting
and a $500 bond); Elk Grove, Ill., Ordinance 1270, § 18.4703 (Jan. 23,
1979) (fingerprinting); Flossmoor, Ill., Ordinance FMC, amending ch. 21, art.
III of Flossmoor Municipal Code § 21.304 (Jan. 4, 1980) (prior consent of occupant before soliciting is permitted); Hazel Crest, Ill., Ordinance 1-1974,
§ 11(e) (Jan. 8, 1974) (prohibits all paid solicitors); Kildeer, Ill., Ordinance
73-0-189 (Dec. 6, 1973) (prohibits all soliciting and peddling); LAKE FOREST,
ILL., CODE ch. 9, § 29-34 (1971) (fingerprinting); Lake Zurich, Ill., Ordinance
737, § 2 (Jan. 17, 1972) (fingerprinting); LIBERTYVILLE, ILL., CODE ch. 25,
§ 25(c) (1979) (fingerprints and photographs by the police); LINDENHURST,
ILL., CODE ch. 79, § 79.20 (1973) (banning all soliciting); Lisle, Ill., Ordinance
558, § 3 (Mar. 4, 1975) (fingerprinting); NORTHFIELD, ILL., CODE ch. 27, § 27-3
(1966) (fingerprinting); Oakbrook, Ill.,
Ordinance G-95 (Nov. 12, 1968) (§ 5 requires a $100 bond and § 6 requires evidence of good character); Oakbrook
Terrace, Ill., Ordinance 216, § 3 (Nov. 28, 1971) (fingerprinting); Palos
Heights, Ill., Ordinance 0-21-71 (Mar. 16, 1971) (bans all soliciting except by
charities recognized by the IRS); PROSPECT HEIGHTS, ILL, CODE ch. 2,
§ 2.12(c) (1962) (fingerprinting); STREAMWOOD,ILL., CODE ch. 21, § 21.034(c)
(1970) (fingerprinting); WILLOWBROOK, ILL., CODE Title 3, ch. 19, § 3-19-10
(1959) ($25 per day per solicitor fee); WOOD DALE, ILL., CODE ch. 13
amended § 13-461(c) (1976) (fingerprinting and photographs).
20. The Mental Health Association of Greater Chicago has ceased canvassing in a number of communities because it does not want to spend its
resources on litigation. See note 1 supra. CBE of Chicago, on the other
hand, has litigated canvassing ordinances continuously since 1973: Citizens
for a Better Env't v. Cicero, No. 73-C-1908 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 23, 1973); Citizens
for a Better Env't v. Waukegan, No. 75-C-1658 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 8, 1975), rev'd
sub nom. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Park Ridge, 567 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.
1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Highland Park, No. 75-C-1349 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 22, 1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Lansing, No. 75-C-1787 (N.D. Ill.
June 26, 1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Joliet, No. 75-C-1936 (N.D. ll.

Feb. 26, 1976); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Oak Lawn, No. 75-C-1640 (N.D.

Ill. July 22, 1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Midlothian, No. 77-C-4138
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Justice, No. 76-C-470
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 1977), aff'd sub nom. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village
of Schaumburg, 590 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Citi-

zens for a Better Env't v. Chicago Heights, 480 F. Supp. 188 (1979); Citizens
for a Better Env't v. Olympia Fields, No. 80-C-0756 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 18, 1980).
CBE has not lost any of the above cases, however, it still faces a
number of ordinances in the Chicago area which it could litigate. See note

19 supra. CBE's dilemma, like that of other canvassing groups, is that instead of communicating with residents and gaining their support it becomes an opponent in court of the very people it wishes to win over.
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newly drafted regulations in the same municipality 2' or unchallenged regulations in other municipalities will be less burdensome and prohibitive. 22 Canvassing groups can thus be faced
with unending litigation. Despite its long and distinguished history,23 the door-to-door canvass as a technique for reaching the
public will not be able to survive the current array of ordinances
with occasional court challenges.
HISTORY

Going from house to house in America has been traced back
to the early peddlers of the frontier.24 The first door-to-door approach whose primary goal was not selling goods was probably
made in the name of religion. 25 Soon thereafter, if not simulta21. After a recent Supreme Court decision, Town of Southampton v.
Troyer, 101 S. Ct. 522 (1980), which held that a town could not prohibit doorto-door fund raising, Southampton's town supervisor was quoted to the effect that his town would look into passing some other type of restrictive
ordinance. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1980, at 13, col. 5 (midwest ed.).
22. Professor Chafee predicted this problem. "The limitations they [the
holdings in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)] impose on governmental control of street distributions and solicitations look a bit fragile for a rough and tumble world. I
wonder whether they can last, whether enforcement officials will not somehow or other circumvent them." CHAFEE, supra note 10, at 405-06.
There are several ways municipal officials can circumvent a court ruling. A new ordinance easily can be drafted which is different from previously litigated ordinances. By drafting a new ordinance, unless money
damages are sought, the municipality has little to lose except attorneys'
fees in a new suit. Since the Supreme Court has never upheld a door-todoor canvassing ordinance, other than for commercial peddlers as in Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), there is no certainty as to what kind of
ordinance will prevail against a constitutional attack.
The licensing schemes are likely to run afoul of the prior restraint doctrine, and all forms of regulation are vulnerable to rules against vagueness, overbreadth and excessive delegation of discretion . .

.

. [I]t is

not possible to say with certainty to what extent carefully drawn restrictions of this kind would be upheld, if at all, or on what theory they
would be judged.
T.I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 348 (1970).

Despite this problem, the Supreme Court will not invade the legislative
chambers. "[I]t is not our business to require legislatures to extend the
area of prohibition or regulation beyond the demands of revealed abuses.
And the greatest leeway must be given to the legislative judgment of what
those demands are." Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); hence, the need for a model ordinance.
23. See text accompanying notes 24-42 infra.
24. R.L. WRIGHT, HAWKERS AND WALKERS IN EARLY AMERICANA 18, 25, 28
(1927) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. It was perhaps at this time that doorto-door peddling gained its unsavory reputation as well. See S.M. CUTLIP,
FUNDRAISING IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1965)

[hereinafter cited as CUTP].

25. T.E. BROCE, FUNDRAiSING 10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BROCEJ;
CuTLP, supra note 24, at 6; MARTS, supra note 5, at 96; WRIGHT, supra note
24, at 149-54.
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neously, some early colleges occasionally raised funds on a
door-to-door basis. 26 In 1841 the American Tract Society 27 began
its interdenominational sale of Bibles and other religious literature, which to this day is carried on by Jehovah's Witnesses.
Save for a few notable failures, 28 it was not until the beginning
of the twentieth century that systematic appeals were made at
the door to support charitable, religious, or political causes. 29
The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) is credited
with the first organized, highly visible, charitable door-to-door
campaigns; and it was in the wake of these drives, especially
when commissioned fund raisers were employed, that ethical
30
questions were first raised.
Political door-to-door campaigns, particularly by candidates
running for office, predate the American Revolution. 3 1 Labor organizers recruited union members door-to-door in the nineteenth century. 32 The Civil War may have been the first time in
America 33 that money was raised by door-to-door solicitations
for a patriotic, political cause: the Union's war effort. World
26. MARTS, supra note 5, at 96-97. One of the unpleasant tasks of early
American college presidents was the solicitation of donations. Ben Franklin, nevertheless, was so good at soliciting fellow Philadelphians for college
donations that churchmen sought and received his sound advice on fundraising; CuTLip, supra note 24, at 10 describes how Mary Lyons raised nearly
$30,000 by personal house-to-house solicitations in the 1830s to help found
Mt. Holyoke College. See also BAKAL, supra note 2, at 24-25; BROCE, supra
note 25, at 10.
27. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145 n.6 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 nn.4-6 (1943) (citing Acts 20:20 (New Testament);
Mark 16:15 (New Testament) as indicative of the ancient origins of houseto-house activities).
28. One of the first known failures of a systematic house-to-house charitable campaign was Mathew Carey's federated fund drive in Philadelphia in
1829. CuTLip, supra note 24, at 7-9.
29. "With the exception of Jay Cooke's spectacular sale of government
bonds through exploitation of patriotic needs, most organized fundraising
efforts in America's 19th Century were small-scale affairs designed to aid
the church, the college, the relief of paupers at home, or the starving
abroad." CUTLp, supra note 24, at 12.
30. It was around the turn of the century that paid solicitors for charitable funds first appeared. They generated so many complaints that after
World War I the National Investigation Bureau of War Charities banned
door-to-door soliciting by commissioned fundraisers. CUTLIP, supra note 24,
at 15, 16, 142-43. Professional fundraising evoked images of "a person who
would do almost anything to wheedle or trick a few dollars out of the public
for any so-called 'charity'." MARTS, supra note 5, at 112. As a result, after
World War I, professional fundraisers came to be paid a fixed fee. The prohibition on commissioned salaries has lapsed over time.
31. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 n.9 (1943) (indicates that
political door-to-door canvassing was a way of life in many states).
32. Id. at 141, 145-46.
33. CuTLp, supra note 24, at 11-12. See note 29 supra.
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Wars I and II gave door-to-door solicitation for political causes
34
some of its finest hours.
In the early 1950s the volume of door-to-door canvassing
reached modern proportions in terms of frequency and dollar
volume. 35 Today door-to-door canvassing causes range from
traditional charities 36 (e.g., Cancer Society, March of Dimes,
38
37
etc.) to candidates seeking support to public interest groups
4
°
39
to new and old religions. That these varieties of not-for-profit
canvassing are an important facet of American society is nearly
beyond dispute.
Despite this apparent upsurge of door-to-door canvassing in
the last three decades, there has also been an opposing trend.
Rising crime rates, distrust of strangers, and municipal regulations have all combined to diminish the number of door-to-door
campaigns. 4 1 The last mentioned cause-regulations--can be
ascribed in part to the United States Supreme Court's decisions
34. The American Red Cross reorganized its fundraising efforts during
World War I and raised millions of dollars. Although the Depression of the
1930s caused a significant reduction in donations, the federal government's
bond-raising efforts during World War II were an overwhelming success.
See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).

35. In 1948 there were 1,750,000 door-to-door peddlers grossing $3.5 billion. E. LIFSHEY, DOOR TO DOOR SELLING 5 (1948). By the 1950s most communities could expect one peddler or canvasser per month at each home.
See F.E. ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPIc GIVING 134 (1950). At the same time,
charities were raising $15 billion per year-of which a large proportion came
from door-to-door campaigns. See BROCE, supra note 25, at 13. See also
Amicus Curiae Brief for Coalition of Nat'l Voluntary Organizations, Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
36. Examples of traditional charities raising substantial amounts of
money on a door-to-door basis include the Girl Scouts of America, the Kidney Foundation, American Heart Association, YMCA, Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, and the Council for Financial Aid to Education. See
Amicus Curiae Brief for Coalition of Nat'l Voluntary Organizations, Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
37. Chicago Democrats employ one of the most successful canvasses,
registering large numbers of voters and raising support for the organization.
M. RoYvo, Boss (1971).

38. See notes 6 and 10 supra. An interesting sidelight on public interest
groups is their collection of funds relative to traditional charities.
"[R] evenues of all the more than 150 national organizations in the environmental field do not exceed by much the approximately $125 million or so
taken in annually by the American Cancer Society." BAKAL, supra note 2,
at 286. (emphasis in original).
39. E.g., The Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity
("Moonies").
40. Amicus Curiae Brief for National Council of Churches of Christ in
the United States of America, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs,
The Lutheran Council in the United States of America, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
41. BAKAL, supra note 2, at 322. The Mental Health Association of
Greater Chicago suffered greatly from this combination as well as from economic conditions which caused a decline in the number of volunteer canvassers. See notes 1 and 21 supra.
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ascribed in part to the United States Supreme Court's decisions
on door-to-door canvassing regulations. 42
Cases
An important early case dealing solely with distribution of
literature on the streets is Lovell v. Griffin.4 3 In Lovell, an ordinance required all persons who intended to distribute literature
to obtain permission from the city manager, regardless of the
method of distribution. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the ordinance covered distribution so broadly and because distribution was essential to publication, the ordinance
was unconstitutional on its face. The Court was particularly
concerned that this type of ordinance "would restore the system
of license and censorship in its baldest form."" Except for obscene literature or literature which advocated unlawful conduct,
the Court did not view such permit requirement systems as consistent with the first amendment. By analogy, permit systems
for door-to-door distribution of literature appeared to be in jeopardy.
This apparent status of permit systems was altered by
Schneider v. State.45 In Schneider an elaborate 46 licensing system for door-to-door canvassers and solicitors was held unconstitutional as applied to the canvasser who had been arrested for
handing out booklets and asking for contributions for a religious
cause. Although the Court considered several aspects of the or42. "By deciding that permit requirements are valid if they do not allow
too much administrative discretion and are not applied in a discriminatory
manner, the Supreme Court did not solve all possible problems." F.S.
HAiMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH

63 (1976). See note 22 supra. See also Village

of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 631 (1976)

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (municipalities continue to face practical
problems in light of Supreme Court decisions on the regulation of door-to-

door canvassing).
43. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).

44. Id. at 452 (the liberty of circulation is as essential to freedom of the
press as is the liberty of publication).
45. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See also Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (a pre-Schneider case holding a permit ordinance

for a labor union assembly invalid).
46. Although four ordinances were before the Court, only the ordinance
of Irvington, New Jersey applied to door-to-door canvassing. The others ap-

plied to the distribution of literature on the street. The Irvington ordinance
required a written permit from the chief of police, or the officer in charge of
police headquarters, before anyone could "canvass, solicit, distribute circulars or other matter, or call from house to house." 308 U.S. at 157. To obtain
a permit the applicant had to supply personal information and be fingerprinted and photographed by the police. A permit would be denied if the

police decided, among other things, that the canvasser was "not of good
character." 308 U.S. at 164.
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dinance "burdensome and inquisitorial, ' 47 none was singled out
as unconstitutional on its own, nor did the Court expressly state
that permit or licensing systems were unconstitutional. 4 8 In49
stead, the Schneider Court suggested that certain features of
canvassing, such as hours, could be regulated. By apparently
giving regulators of canvassing more freedom than it forbade,
the Schneider decision opened the door to a mass of permit
50
schemes which prevail to this day.
Soon after Schneider another permit system, this one applicable only to solicitors for money, came before the Court.5 1 The
regulation in Cantwell v. Connecticut 52 granted discretion to a
governmental official to determine the bona fides of the organization. Without specific standards, 53 the potential to censor legitimate speech and possible abuse of discretion created by the
47. "The applicant must submit ... evidence as to his good character
and as to the absence of fraud in the 'project' he proposes to promote or the
literature he intends to distribute, and must undergo a burdensome and inquisatorial examination, including photographing and fingerprinting." 308
U.S. at 163-64.
48. The Court implied that the freedom of expression should not "depend upon the exercise of the officer's discretion," and held the ordinance
inapplicable and void without invalidating any particular portion of the permit system. 308 U.S. at 164-65.
49. Id. at 165.
50. See Arlington Heights, Ill., Ordinance 68-109, § 20-801 (Oct. 7, 1968);
Batavia, Ill., Ordinance 71-115 (May 3,1971); Bolingbrook, Ill., Ordinance 7524 (Mar. 25, 1975); Buffalo Grove, Ill., Ordinance 70-27 (Aug. 17, 1970); CHICAGO RIDGE, ILL., CODE

ch. 13, art. 54 (1965);

DOWNERS GROVE, ILL., CODE

ch.

15 (1969); GENEVA, ILL., CODE ch. 18, art. 111 (1962); Glen Ellyn, Ill., Ordinance 2197-rc, amending Title 3, ch. 3 (May 23, 1977); HOFFMAN ESTATES,
ILL., CODE ch. 5, art. 66 (1971); KENILWORTH, ILL., CODE ch. 7 (1970); LAKE IN
THE HILLS, ILL., CODE ch. 35 (1968); LOMBARD, ILL., CODE ch. 5.56 amended
(1970); MORTON GROVE, ILL., CODE ch. 114 amended (1969); NILES, ILL., CODE
ch. 23 amended (1965); NORTHFIELD, ILL., CODE ch. 27 (1966); Park Forest
South, Ill., Ordinance 318 (Aug. 24, 1976); ROSELLE, ILL., CODE ch. 9, art. IV,
div. 3 (1970); SKOKIE, ILL., CODE ch. 46 (1979).
Chicago does not have a permit scheme or regulations of any type for
door-to-door soliciting or canvassing. See also note 19 supra.
51. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1940). At issue was a
Connecticut statute which provided in part:
No person shall solicit ... unless such cause shall have been approved
by the secretary of the public welfare council. Upon application of any
person in behalf of such cause, the secretary shall determine whether
such cause is a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy and conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity
and, if he shall so find, shall approve the same and issue... a certificate to that effect.
52. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
53. The statute authorized the secretary of the public welfare council of
the state to determine whether a particular cause is religious. If not, approval to canvass is denied. Thus the statute could be subject to the whims
or prejudices of the state authority. 310 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1940). Cf.CHAFEE,

supra note 10, at 407 (defending the discretion of trained officials "to weed
out undesirables").
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regulation was too great, and it was held unconstitutional. The
Court did not go so far as to state that all permit systems
amounted to prior restraint; rather, the Court approved of regulations of solicitation for funds as a way for the state to prevent
55
fraud. 54 The Court even suggested an identification system.
Whether this right to regulate applied only to the state, and not
56
to numerous municipal governments, was never specified
Even so, Cantwell certainly gave both municipal and state regulators enough leeway to require permits of those who ask for
money while speaking to people door-to-door. Except for specific types of permit systems recently ruled unconstitutional,
57
this holds true today.
Even though he preferred that the homeowner decide and
indicate whether canvassers were welcome at the door (e.g.,
with a sign) ,58 the champion of the first amendment, 59 Justice
54. 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).

/
55. "Without doubt a state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him
publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his
authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent." Id. at 306. If
the canvasser is a local girl scout rather than a "stranger" does the Court
imply that such exceptions would be constitutional? Some municipalities
have taken the Court's language literally. See BROOKFIELD, ILL., CODE ch. 7,
§ 7-24(c) (12) (amended 1966) (fee varies for local versus out of town solicitors); CHICAGO HEIGHTS, ILL., CODE ch. 32, § 32-2 (1972) (local exemption);
CLARENDON HILLS, ILL., CODE ch. 34, § 34.07 (1977) (exempts local dairy com-

panies from canvassing regulations);

LEMONT, ILL, CODE

art. 22, § 23.2205

(1963) (exempts municipal residents); Mundelein, 11l., Ordinance 78-4-10
(Apr. 24, 1978) (§ 5 exempts local merchants and farmers); WnLOw
SPRINGS, ILL., CODE

ch. 10, § 5-10 (1967) (exempts local not-for-profit organi-

zations). This list is not exhaustive; other numerous Chicago area ordinances give city councils or village boards the power to exempt whomever
they wish. The local exemption does of course raise fourteenth amendment
equal protection questions.
56. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940).
57. "Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable
regulation. . . ." Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 632 (1980). See also Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619
(1976).
58. The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has proposed a
form of regulation to its member cities 13 which would make it an offense for any person to ring the bell of a householder who has appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed. This or any similar
regulation leaves the decision as to whether distributors of literature
may lawfully call at a home where it belongs-with the homeowner
himself.
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (citation omitted). In footnote
13 the Court stated, "We do not, by this reference, mean to express any
opinion on the wisdom or validity of the particular proposals of the Institute." Perhaps if the Court had expressed an opinion there would have
been much less litigation.
59. See Meiklejohn, Public Speech in the Burger Court: The Influence of
Mr. Justice Black, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 301 (1977). See also Justice Black's dissent in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 649 (1951), which upheld a ped-
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Black, approved of registration systems for canvassers. In Martin v. Struthers,60 which invalidated an ordinance making it unlawful to distribute literature door-to-door, Justice Black
suggested that cities use "identification devices."'61 He did not
specify what the devices should be, saying that cities should
work the systems out for themselves. 62 Until Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell63 in 1976, towns and cities did indeed work things out
for themselves, because the Court gave them no more guidance
for their permit systems and registration requirements than the
vague dicta in Schneider, Cantwell, and Martin.
Prior to Hynes, there was a line of cases dealing with
64
whether the first amendment protected "commercial speech"
on the streets and at the door. The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech was in past cases crucial 65 for
purposes of first amendment protection, and still is particularly
relevant to door-to-door canvassing because many ordinances
regulate the two separately, and often regulate commercial
speech more restrictively. 66 An early case, Valentine v.
dling ordinance applied against a magazine salesman: "[T~he freedom of
the people of this Nation cannot survive even a little governmental hobbling
of religious or political ideas, whether they be communicated orally or
through the press." Id. at 650. Nonetheless, Justice Black did not believe
that merchants selling pots door-to-door should enjoy first amendment protection. 341 U.S. at 650 n.*.
60. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
61. Id. at 148.
62. Id. at 148-49.
63. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
64. "Commercial speech" has been defined as that which is not "communicating information and disseminating opinion" but is "purely commercial advertising," Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); or
"[I Information about the characteristics and costs of goods and services,"
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980);
or just plain "selling," Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951). See
generally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
65. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
66. See, e.g., BROOKFIELD, ILL., CODE ch. 7, § 7-24.13 (1966); Carol Stream,
Ill., Ordinance 267 (Sept. 14, 1971); CRETE, ILL., CODE ch. 2, § 2.2.20 (1973);
GLENDALE HEIGHTS, ILL., CODE ch. 15 amended, § 15-2 (1977); LA GRANGE,
ILL., CODE ch. 117 amended, §§ 117-55, 117-60 (1962); LA GRANGE PARK, ILL.,
CODE ch. 15, arts. 1-I1 (1970); LINCOLNSHIRE, ILL., CODE ch. 45, § 45-14 (1961);
NILES, ILL., CODE ch. 23 (1965); Northbrook, Ill., Ordinance 70-35 (June 9,
1970); Palos Heights, Ill., Ordinance 0-21-71 (Mar. 16, 1971); Palos Hills, Ill.,
Ordinance 450 (Aug. 9, 1973); PARK FOREST, ILL., CODE ch. 23 amended
(1966); RIVER GROVE, ILL., CODE ch. 32 (1958); ROSELLE, ILL., CODE ch. 9, art.

VI (1970); St. Charles, Ill., Ordinance 1979-M amending ch. 25 (Mar. 5, 1979);
Tinley Park, Ill., Ordinance 74-0-029 (July 1, 1974); WESTMONT, ILL., CODE ch.
16, art. III amended (1972); WILOW SPRINGS, ILL, CODE ch. 10 (1967).
One commentator, moreover, suggests that a further distinction among
door-to-door canvassers be incorporated, i.e., charitable solicitors should receive less protection than religious solicitors. See Jones, supra note 17.
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Chrestensen,67 although it did not deal with door-to-door canYassing, 68 did bolster the municipality's right to bar distribution
of commercial literature, even with a noncommercial message
appended.69

On the other hand, a distribution of religious literature
which incorporates an appeal for money could not be prohibited,
71
as in Jamison v. Texas. 70 Moreover, Murdock v. Pennsylvania
held that the sale of religious literature at the door would not
subject itinerant preachers to commercial license fee requirements, nor would the preacher's earning a living from the sale of
such literature bring him into the commercial category, as in
Follett v. McCormick.72 In Murdock the Court conceded that
"drawing a line" 73 between commercial and noncommercial activity would be difficult. The only solution was for the Court to
look at the entire transaction 74 to determine whether it was primarily commercial or noncommercial.
In Breard v. Alexandria,75 the Court upheld a door-to-door
magazine salesman's conviction for violating a nuisance ordinance that banned peddling despite his defense that such sales
were protected by the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and press. In the Court's view, the primary object of the
transaction, sale of the magazine, made it commercial. How67. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
68. The respondent was distributing handbills on city streets.
69. On one side of the handbill was an advertisement about a submarine exhibition and on the other side was a protest of the City Dock Department's refusal of wharfage facilities for the vessel. 316 U.S. at 53.
70. 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (religious group distributed handbills which on
one side included details of a forthcoming speech and on the other repeated
the invitation but also offered two books for sale).
71. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). The Court also noted that the right to use the
press for the expression of views is not the same as the distribution of commercial handbills. Furthermore, "it should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge." 319 U.S. at 111.
72. 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (license fee on minister selling religious books
would amount to a tax on first amendment constitutional privilege of free
exercise of religion).
73. "As we have said, the problem of drawing the line between a purely
commercial activity and a religious one will at times be difficult." Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943). See also Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 639, 642 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) ("We agree
that the fact that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment. The selling, however, brings into the transaction a commercial feature."); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-77
(1943) (determining that itinerant preachers who make their living from
selling religious literature are not engaged in "commercial undertakings");
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (noting that the selling of
religious literature is a part of a wholly religious activity).
75. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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ever, since Breard, the line between unprotected commercial
76
speech and constitutionally protected speech has blurred.
Now, an outright ban on commercial speech is no longer constitutionally permissible, 77 although the Court recognized the need
for and permits greater regulation of commercial speech than
noncommercial speech. 78 Whether the recent first amendment
require a differprotection granted to commercial speech would
79
ent result in a Breard situation is unclear.
Two recent cases, Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell 8° and Schaumburg v. Citizensfor a Better Environment,81 involved ordinances
regulating door-to-door canvassing which attempted to follow
the Court's dicta that identification and registration systems
were permissible. The Court voided the ordinance in Hynes for
several reasons. First, the ordinance made various exceptions
to its permit scheme, notably for canvassers working for a "recognized charitable cause," 82 without defining the phrase. In ad76. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertisement of routine services by lawyers constitutionally protected); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (drug prices); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortion
advertisement).
77. "Last Term in Bigelow v. Virginia . . . the notion of unprotected
'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene." Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759
(1976). See generally Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the FirstAmendment, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 430, 431, 444-45 (1977) (the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech is purely artificial and thus both
types should be fully protected by the first amendment).
78. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (certain features of commercial speech differentiate it from other varieties of speech in ways that

suggest a different degree of protection); Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 456 (1978) ('To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and non-commercial speech alike could invite dilution ... of the force
of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.").

See generally Comment, Unsolicited Commercial Telephone Calls and the
First Amendment: A ConstitutionalHangup, 11 PAC. L. J. 143, 160 (1979).
79. For example, in Ohralik, the first amendment would not protect a

lawyer from a disciplinary action for improper in-person solicitation. The
Court distinguished Ohralik from the constitutionally protected advertising

by lawyers in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), on the ground

that the in-person solicitation was an area of potential harm such that the
state had a greater interest in protecting the public. Thus, the in-person
aspect of door-to-door magazine sales may be enough to permit municipalities to ban it. On the other hand, the protection afforded magazines under
the freedom of the press clause may be enough to extend it to the door-todoor sale of magazines. The latter position was taken by Mr. Justice Black
in his dissent in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 649 (1951). The question
is whether the in-person distinction will control in future commercial
speech cases.
80. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).

81. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
82. 425 U.S. at 621. The difficulty of defining whether a particular group
is charitable, religious or commercial is particularly vexing for municipali-

ties. See Jones, supra note 17, at 56.
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dition, the ordinance did not specify the type of information and
identification to be supplied to the police department prior to
canvassing. Because of these ambiguities, the Court found the
ordinance impermissibly vague. The Court expressly stated
that it would not decide whether the ordinance would be constitutional if its vague provisions were made more specific. 83 Instead, the Court repeated the general rule that "the police power
'84
permits reasonable regulation for public safety.
In Village of Schaumburg, the ordinance 85 required charitable organizations that solicit contributions to show that at least
seventy-five percent of the proceeds collected were used for the
"charitable purpose. ' 86 The ordinance's definition of "charitable
purpose" excluded solicitors' wages and attorneys' fees, as well
as other "administrative expenses." The Supreme Court agreed
with the lower courts that the seventy-five percent rule was unconstitutionally overbroad because it would prohibit solicitation
by legitimate organizations. Specifically, the Court pointed out
that the Schaumburg ordinance would impede those groups
whose primary activities included the dissemination of information by its paid solicitors and advocacy by its attorneys. 87 Furthermore, the Court noted that such paid solicitors were not
engaged in commercial speech because their solicitations were
not concerned with private economic decisions. 88
The Village of Schaumburg argued that the ordinance only
83. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976).
84. Id. at 619.
85. Article IH of chapter 22 of the Schaumburg Village Code. The relevant sections of this ordinance appear in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 622-24 nn.1-4 (1980).
86. The case focuses on § 22-20(g), which set out the conditions necessary to satisfy the 75% requirement. The ordinance provides that the following items shall not be deemed to be used for the charitable purposes of
the organization: "(1)
Salaries or commissions paid to solicitors; (2) Administrative expenses of the organization, including, but not limited to, salaries, attorneys' fees, rents, telephone, advertising expenses, contributions
to other organizations and persons, except as charitable contributions and
related expenses incurred as administrative or overhead items." 444 U.S. at
624.
87. 444 U.S. at 635-36. By considering attorneys' fees not to be a charitable purpose, the Schaumburg ordinance in effect bans a particular form of
speech-litigation-protected by the first amendment. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
88. 444 U.S. at 632. See Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
During oral arguments for Village of Schaumburg, the Court was concerned about the distinction between commercial and noncommercial solicitation. For example, Mr. Justice White hypothesized a writer going doorto-door raising funds to publish his book and a college student selling
magazines door-to-door to pay his way through college (from the author's
personal notes of oral argument). Whether these activities would be protected by the first amendment depends in part on the viability of Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See note 79 supra.
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attempted to serve the legitimate municipal interests of preventing fraud and preserving privacy. The Court agreed that
Schaumburg's goals were sound, but found the seventy-five percent provision not "narrow enough" 89 to serve these governmental interests. Nevertheless, as the Court has always done, it left
the municipality's power to regulate door-to-door canvassing intact, suggesting that disclosure of the use of the funds collected
may be the proper way to prevent fraud.90 Hence the Court may
some day decide the constitutionality of a disclosure ordinance,
just as it has had to decide the constitutionality of an identification system (Hynes) and a fraud prevention device (Village of
Schaumburg), both of which the Court had previously suggested.9 1
The current Supreme Court standards for door-to-door canvassing ordinances still allow municipalities to require the canvasser to establish his identity, 92 although this requirement
must not be vague. Municipalities can also require disclosure of
finances 93 and regulate the hours of canvassing. 94 These regulations cannot grant discretion to the administering agencies if
that discretion carries any potential to determine what
messages the residents will hear,95 as did the regulation in
Cantwell. The regulations must be narrowly drawn so that they
serve a legitimate municipal interest, such as fraud prevention,
96
without unnecessarily infringing upon canvassers' speech.
Yet exactly what identification can be required, how much
financial information can be requested, and what hours are reasonable are areas that are left open for creative muncipalities to
keep door-to-door canvassers out.9 7 For canvassing organiza89. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637.
90. Id.
91. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (identification system);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940) (fraud prevention).

92. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 618 (1976), citing Justice
Black's "identification devices" from Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. at 148.
93. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637-38.
94. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939).
95. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
96. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637. The Court found that the
75% provision which was intended to protect against fraud, crime and undue annoyances "only peripherally promoted" those goals, and that there

were "measures less destructive of First Amendment interests" available.
97. Indeed, the hours limitation is a popular and effective way to stifle
door-to-door canvassing. A 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. curfew prevents canvassers

from reaching the vast bulk of working people, thereby rendering the canvass futile. See generally Jones, supra note 17, at 56. See, e.g., BARTLETr,
ILL., CODE ch. 15, § 15.1612 (1965); Batavia, Ill., Ordinance 71-K, § 9 (Mar. 3,
1971); Burr Ridge, Ill., Ordinance 191, § 5 (Sept. 18, 1972); CLARENDON HILLS,
ILL., CODE ch. 34,

§ 34.09

(1977); COUNTRYSIDE, ILI., CODE

ch.

12,

art. VI
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tions this means the growth of the ever-increasing patchwork 9 8
of municipal ordinances will continue unabated, unless the
Supreme Court bans such regulation altogether, or the municipalities adopt a constitutionally fair, uniform ordinance. Since
the former solution is highly unlikely in light of the Court's consistent support for such regulations, the latter approach may be
the only way 99 to balance' 00 the canvassing organizations' first
amendment rights with the municipalities' legitimate exercise
of police power, and to avoid the endless stream of litigation.
MODEL ORDINANCE

Here are some suggested provisions for a "not-for-profit solicitors"'' 1 ordinance:
Section 1.102 "Not-for-profit solicitor" means people or organizaamended, § 12-6.05 (1970); DES PLAINES, ILL., CODE ch. 46 amended, § 5-46-9
(1963); HINSDALE, ILL., CODE ch. 21 amended, § 21-6A.05 (1965);
LIBERTYVILLE, ILL., CODE ch. 25, § 25.8 (1979); NORTHFIELD, ILL., CODE ch. 27,
§ 27-9 (1966); NORTH RIVERSIDE, ILL., CODE art. 52, § 2-52-7 (1966); LAKE FOR-

EST, ILL., CODE ch. 29, art. IV, § 29-44 (1971); Orland Park, Ill., Ordinance 539,
§ 11 (Apr. 9, 1973); RIVER GROVE, ILL., CODE ch. 29, art. IV, § 29-44 (1958).
98. In the Chicago area alone there are over 100 suburban municipalities, each with its own ordinances. They differ from each other in letter,
spirit, or enforcement. Furthermore, each requires a separate registration
application.
99. "Police power" encompasses the inherent right of state and local
governments to enact legislation protecting the health, safety, morals or
general welfare of the people within their jurisdictions. These are decisions
of strategy and policy and are nonjudicial. See generally J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 389 (1977); O'NEAL, supra note 10,
at 54. See also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 152 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (as to whose responsibility it is to regulate door-to-door canvassers).
100. There is also the balance between the rights of the speaker, a willing
listener, and the resident who wants to be left alone. See Stone, supra note
10, at 342, 371. On the other hand, the right of privacy should not be so protected that a blanket prohibition prevents access to all residents of a community regardless of their interests. See T.I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 558 (1970).
101. This article does not intend to suggest a "for-profit" solicitors' ordinance, nor is it intended to design an identification ordinance for petitioners
or other non-fundraising activities.
102. The Illinois Municipal League Information Services (May 6, 1970)
has a model ordinance (League Model) pertaining to the regulation of solicitors which defines soliciting.
Section 1: Definitions:
That for the purpose of this Article, the following words as used
herein shall be construed to have the meaning herein ascribed thereto,
to-wit:
Soliciting: shall mean and include any one or more of the following activities:
Seeking to obtain orders for the purchase of goods, wares, merchandise, foodstuffs, services, of any kind, character or description
whatever, for any kind of consideration whatever, or
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tions
a)

seeking subscriptions to periodicals, books, or any other
publication, or
b) requesting gifts or contributions of money or other items
of value, or
c) selling or giving away candy, buttons, or other items in exchange for a donation of money or any item of value
for the benefit of any charitable or not-for-profit association, organization, corporation or project engaging in any benevolent, philanpatriotic, eleemosynary, educational, or public
thropic, religious,
10 3
interest activity.
Section 2.104 All "not-for-profit solicitors" who desire to visit
any residential building or structure in the community without the
05
prior consent of the resident shall file a letter with the city clerk'
at least five business days prior to the proposed solicitation.
Section 2 gives a municipality a reasonable time to make an investigation of the applying organization and its solicitors.
Section 3. The letter filed with the city clerk shall contain the
following information:
a) name, address, and phone number of the organization;
b) name, address, and business phone number of the principal officers of the organization, including the direct supervisor of the solicitation;
c) a summary breaking down the uses of the funds collected
or a copy of the most recent financial statement prepared
by an independent auditor;
d) dates, times, and places of the proposed solicitation;
e) name, address, phone number, and social security number
of all persons who will solicit;
Seeking to obtain prospective customers for application or
purchase of insurance of any type or character; or
Seeking to obtain subscriptions to books, magazines, periodicals,
newspapers and every other type or kind of publication; or
Seeking to obtain gifts or contributions of money, clothing or any
other valuable thing for the support or benefit of any charitable or
non-profit association, organization, corporation or project.
Although the suggested definition in the text is based upon this definition, it eliminates "for-profit" types of activities. A large number of municipalities in the Chicago area have adopted the League Model either in whole
or in substantial part.
103. This definition is based upon the definition set out in the model ordinance recommended by Bronson C. Lafollette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, dated April 14, 1978. Section 2(D) provides: "Charitable organization
shall include any benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic or eleemosynary. person, partnership, association or corporation; or one purporting to be such."
104. Section 2 of the League Model provides: "Every person desiring to
engage in soliciting as herein defined from persons in residences within the
municipality, is hereby required to make written application for a Certificate of Registration as hereinafter provided."
105. The League Model requires that applications be made to the police
chief. This, however, seems to be an unnecessary task for the police and is
better handled with less intimidation of the canvassers by civilian administrators, as long as the police are adequately informed of the canvass.
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f)

names of any officer or solicitor who has been convicted 10of6
a felony under the laws of any state or under federal law.

These requirements provide the municipality with enough information to protect its citizens without placing an undue burden
on the canvassing organization.
Section 4. Permission to solicit shall be granted within five business days of receipt of the letter; failure to grant or deny permission within10 7five business days shall be deemed a grant of
permission.
This provision is mandated by A Quaker Action Group v. Morton,108 which required administrative action within twenty-four
hours on demonstration-permit applications. Immediate action
is necessitated by the priority of first amendment rights, since a
delay in their enforcement can be equivalent to denial. From a
practical standpoint, this provision also reduces the scheduling
difficulties of canvassing organizations in large metropolitan areas.
Section 5. The city clerk can deny permission to solicit only on
one or more of the following grounds:
a) statements in the letter were untrue or incomplete;
b) the organization or solicitors have engaged in documentable fraudulent transactions;
c) the funds or other items collected will not be used for the
charitable or not-for-profit association, organization, corporation, or project. 10 9
An explicit, ministerial means of denying permission is the only
constitutionally permissible method, 110 and any grant of discretion would be suspect."'
106. Section 3 of the League Model requires far more information, some
of dubious utility, such as marital status. It also requires fingerprinting and
allows the police chief to request any additional information deemed necessary. This fingerprinting requirement was held unconstitutional in Citizens
for a Better Env't v. Justice, No. 76 C 470 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 25, 1977), citing with
approval Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The "additional information" requirement seems to grant too much discretion to the police chief,
particularly if he requests an unreasonable amount of information.
107. The League Model does not set a time limit on when the permit to
solicit must be issued. For canvassing organizations this is especially
troublesome because the administrative delays can be unending.
108. 516 F.2d 717, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (such permit applications "must be handled on an expedited basis").
109. Section 4 of the League Model denies a solicitation permit to persons convicted of a felony within five years of application.
110. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951) (absence of a licensing ordinance does not give officials the right to prevent the public from
engaging in first amendment activities).
111. Discretionary power vested in officials may operate as a prior
restraint of first amendment rights. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294
(1951). Reasonably clear guidelines are necessary to prevent official arbitrariness or discrimination in the enforcement of a statute. Smith v.
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Section 6. Any denial of permission to canvass must be in writing with the reason(s) set forth. Within seven business days of receipt of the denial, an organization or individual applicant may
appeal the denial to the city council. The city council must decide
at its next meeting whether to uphold the denial or not. The organization or individual who appeals shall have an opportunity to make
112
a short statement to the city council before it decides the appeal.
This section provides minimal procedural rights 113 to an aggrieved applicant, with first amendment demands for prompt action in mind. It is particularly important that the city council
hear and decide appeals immediately because it is so easy for a
11 4
municipal system to delay a final decision.
Section 7. When permitted, solicitation shall take place only between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. on weekdays and 11 a.m.
and 6 p.m. on Saturdays.
No solicitation shall be allowed on Sun115
days or holidays.
This provision grants the canvassing organization enough hours
to reach a large portion of the working public' 16 without infring11 7
ing on the privacy of the residents of the community.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108 (1972).
112. Section 3 of the League Model only requires the police chief to keep
an accurate record of all applications, information received, and denials of
applications. He is not required to disclose his reasons for rejecting any
application. This can frustrate canvassing organizations and lead to arbitrary decisionmaking.
113. The absence of a provision for administrative or judicial review of a
denial or revocation may violate the constitutional requirement of strict
procedural safeguards. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 271
(7th Cir. 1978); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness of W. Pa, Inc.
v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 671 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
114. CBE, for example, has heard every conceivable reason for delaying
a grant of the canvassing permit-the application processor is on vacation
for the next two weeks; the information sent is incomplete; the application
was never received; the wrong forms were filled out; the village board must
approve your application at the next meeting in two weeks; and the village
board did not get to your application at the meeting.
115. Section 9 of the League Model provides:
It is hereby declared to be unlawful and shall constitute a nuisance for
any person whether registered under this Ordinance or not, to go upon
any premises and ring the door bell upon or near any door of a residence located thereon, or rap or knock upon any door, or create any
sound in any other manner calculated to attract the attention of the occupant of such residence, for the purpose of securing an audience with
the occupant thereof and engage in soliciting as herein defined, prior to
9:00 o'clock A.M. or after 9:00 o'clock P.M. of any week day, or at any
time on a Sunday or on a State or National Holiday.
116. See Jones, supra note 17, at 57 ("The Ihours] limitation cannot prohibit solicitations during those times of the day when the solicitor will have
the best opportunity to contact people.").
117. Individuals can post "No Soliciting" signs or signs that read "Do Not
Solicit After Hour of -. " See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943); see
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There are other provisions which may be included, such as a
revocation provision (which would be similar to denial of permission), penalities for violation of the ordinance and for disobeying "no solicitors" signs, and addition of recent conviction
of a felony to the grounds for denying permission. 118 A rule to
bear in mind is that the regulations must be the least restrictive
available means of accomplishing the governmental goals."l 9 If
municipalities will adopt the proposed provisions without making extraneous or complex revisions, perhaps legitimate and
beneficial canvassing organizations can survive without being
burdened unduly by a patchwork of differing, overly restrictive
ordinances.

generally Comment, Unsolicited Commercial Telephone Calls and the First
Amendment: A ConstitutionalHangup, 11 PAC. L.J. 143, 162 (1979).
118. The felony conviction provision was not included in the proposed
ordinance because it discriminates against those who are rehabilitated. On
the other hand, if there is a rational reason to exclude felons, then it may be
permissible.
119. "Where First Amendment rights are involved, the courts have long
held that government may not employ means more restrictive than absolutely necessary to the task at hand." O'NEAL, supra note 10, at 75. "The
'less restrictive method' individualizes the decision whether to receive the
communication, thereby leaving open the channels of communication with
willing listeners." Stone, supra note 10, at 375.

